NightWatch

For the Night of 29 July 2009

Japan: The leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Yukio Hatoyama, said 29 July he would end a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force support mission that backs U.S.-led anti-terror forces in the Arabian Sea as well as US counter-terror forces in Afghanistan, after the mission mandate expires in January 2010, Agence France-Presse reported. Another top DPJ official said a DPJ government would launch new humanitarian aid projects in Afghanistan instead, a media report said.

A government spokesman accused the DPJ of lacking a clear foreign policy agenda, saying: "I'm afraid the DPJ has not yet concluded a party position. I want it to present its clear position to the public, not the opinions of all its different members." The spokesman also said the government believes the international community expects Japan to continue the mission.

The mission is not popular in Japan. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is on its way out for now and one might hope it would also take with it phony Japanese subservience to US security policy. An alliance of equal and committed partners is stronger, more durable and more mature than an Up-Down relationship, characteristic of adults and children.

South Korea-North Korea: A 30-ton South Korean fishing boat was last seen being towed away by a North Korean patrol boat off the east coast, South Korean officials said today. They suggested the ship might have strayed north of the east coast extension of the Military Demarcation Line, called the MDX, owing to a navigation system error. "It is presumed that the fishing boat was sailing off its destined course because its GPS was out of order," a spokesman added.

The South has requested the North to return the ship and crew promptly but the North has not responded, most likely because it lacks the communications infrastructure to enable a southeast coast naval command to get a reply from Pyongyang political leaders in less than a week.

On the other hand, it is symptomatic of the North-South relationship that the free wheeling southerners invariably and inadvertently give the prune-faced Northerners leverage in talks with the South. Yet the South is vastly superior to the North in all the measurements of national power, including military power. This is their system.

North Korea-China-US: The North is willing to consider a new disarmament agreement if the United States takes into account its security concerns, Wang Guangya, China's vice foreign minister said 28 July, Agence France-Presse reported. Wang said, "China believes that if the package solution that the United States is thinking about accommodates reasonable security concerns, it will be attractive to the North Korean side."

The Chinese insist on presenting the North as a reasonable negotiating partner, not because they are or are not, but because that presentation preserves ties between Beijing and Pyongyang.

Some kind of disarmament talks might emerge, but the North has been explicit repeatedly that talks with the US are the way ahead and everything else is secondary. North Korea does not require a Chinese door mat for presenting its views to the US, which usually takes place in the corridors of the United Nations building.

India-Russia: On 29 July, Defense Minister A. K. Antony told parliament that negotiations with Russia over the price of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov are still going on, ANI reported. Antony said Russia had substantially increased the price over that agreed upon in the 2004 contract. He said the ship's viability also would be considered before the final contract is signed.

The Admiral Gorshkov was initially scheduled to be delivered to India in 2008, and the date has now been pushed back to 2012. Earlier this month, negotiations and terms appeared to have been finalized between the executive branches of both governments. Antony apparently is bringing parliament into the decision loop. One might suspect the only outstanding issue is the size of his bribe for getting parliamentary approval of the renegotiated contract.

Pakistan: The Supreme Court of Pakistan directed the secretary (chief civil servant) of the Ministry of Interior to submit a detailed report on terrorist attacks during the state of emergency that Musharraf announced in November 2007. A 14-member bench of the Supreme Court sought the report while hearing petitions for the regularization of two judges and against the appointment of replacement judges during the 2007 emergency.

Former president Musharraf – who was served notice for today’s hearing – did not appear in court, in personam or by attorney. Musharraf is in London. The hearing was exploratory.

In a separate action, Zafar Ali Shah on Wednesday moved the Supreme Court, seeking a review of its decision that validated the 12 October 1999 military coup by then General Musharraf. While hearing a similar petition filed by Shah against the coup, a 12-member Supreme Court bench had validated the military intervention on 13 May, 2000 on the basis of “doctrine of necessity.”

At least three court actions against Musharraf are pending. These actions are the overt manifestations of a fundamental struggle for authority between the civilian leadership and the armed forces. The outcome and ultimate victor remain unclear. The Army is not likely to accept lightly any blots on its escutcheon from the civilian politicians and the courts, whom it has overthrown with regularity. The Army has governed Pakistan, in a manner of speaking, for 32 of Pakistan’s 62 years as an independent country. This is a study in democracy.

Security. More than 50 Taliban insurgents today attacked the home of a pro-government militia leader, Khalilur Rehman, and killed him in Shangla District, Agence France-Presse reported.

The only reason this has importance is that the Pakistan Army declared Shangla District secure over a month ago. Today Special Envoy Ambassador Holbrooke voiced doubts that Swat Valley was pacified as the Pakistan Army contends. McClatchy news service reporting from Swat reinforces the prudence of Holbrooke’s doubts.

Pakistan-UK: The Member House of Lords, United Kingdom, Lord Nazir Ahmed, said on Tuesday that former president General (retd) Pervez Musharraf could be tried in the International Court of Justice for war crimes. Talking to newsmen here at the Supreme Court, Lord Nazir said that members of the House of Lords, lawyers and people belonging to different walks of life were compiling “proofs “ regarding the alleged involvement of Pervez Musharraf in war crimes, violating the laws as well as detaining people illegally.

“We are in the process of expediting our efforts to collect more evidence against the former military dictator to try him in the International Court of Justice,” Lord Nazir said, adding that if Pervez Musharraf avoided returning to Pakistan, he could even be tried in London.

Comment: The operative words “even be tried in London” indicate that Musharraf has nowhere to hide, certainly not in London. The proliferation of judicial actions against him suggests high level concern that he will try to return to politics after the expiration of period of ineligibility in 2010.

Musharraf wants to vindicate himself, apparently by re-election as president, as much as Nawaz Sharif and Chief Justice Chaudhry want to bring him to justice.

Iran: Parliament speaker Ali Larijani on Wednesday welcomed the takeover by Iraqi security forces of a camp occupied by members of exiled Iranian opposition group the People's Mujahedeen. "Even though it is rather late, the action by the Iraqi government is praiseworthy," a local news agency quoted Larijani as saying.

Hundreds of Iraqi police and soldiers stormed the Ashraf camp northeast of Baghdad on Tuesday sparking clashes in which two police were killed and more than 400 people wounded, 110 of them security personnel, Iraqi police and medics said. More than 50 camp residents were detained.

The significance of this development is that it is one of the few clear instances in which the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad has taken overt action to ease Iranian security concerns.

Russia-US: Too good to omit. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon told U.S. lawmakers 28 July that the United States “would consider” Russian membership in NATO, The Associated Press reported. Gordon said NATO should be open to European democracies and "if Russia meets the criteria and can contribute to common security, and there is a consensus in the alliance, it shouldn't be excluded."

Gordon’s statement looks like ridicule or satire, but those are dangerous rhetorical forms to use in dealing with Congress. Neither communicates via the Internet. Nevertheless, one would like to be reassured that someone at State has heard of CSTO, Prime Minister Putin’s answer to NATO.

Honduras-US: The US revoked the visas of four members of the interim Honduran government as part of its pressure tactics to force Honduras to restore Zelaya as president. This is an endeavor that looks increasingly doubtful.

A state department spokesman said the US also is reviewing the visas of other members of the “de facto government. “ We don't recognize Roberto Micheletti as president of Honduras. We recognize Manuel Zelaya," the spokesman said.

Note: The US bullying of Micheletti risks a blowback effect in which he becomes the latest Latin American hero to stand up to the US. If the Bolivarians experience such an epiphany, they and the Cubans will turn against the US Secretary of State on this issue as fast as a serpent.

Imagine the socialists and communists supporting the free enterprise democrats in Honduras against the US; almost as crazy as the US State Department aligning with the socialists and communists against one of America’s most steadfast allies in Latin America. That would be condign punishment for misrepresenting the facts.

Heretofore, the Carter Administration was renowned for beating up US allies over human rights violations while coddling the communists and socialists, even inviting them to the White House.

Readers would be justified in suspecting that some people at State are covering up their judgmental blunders, indicated by the Department’s persistent distortion of the facts of the Honduran situation. The evidence is overwhelming -- and not refuted by Zelaya or the State Department -- that Zelaya attempted a political coup to usurp the Honduran constitution by means of a referendum that had been ruled unconstitutional by the Honduran Supreme Court.

His gambit failed when the armed forces refused to carry out illegal orders to distribute ballot boxes for the referendum and when the Congress and Supreme Court staged a successful political counter-coup by ordering the army to give him the boot.

If State could commit to rule of law, it might support the coming election in November which is on track and on schedule as the best mechanism for taking the pulse of the Honduran electorate. It might even suggest accelerating the election timetable.

For now a sharply declining number of Hondurans seem to care that Zelaya is absent. They have more important and immediate problems, such as survival.

Afghanistan: Special commentary on the latest edition of the Taliban code of conduct.

A brilliant, astute and insightful Reader sent the following note which precisely corresponds to the findings of the NightWatch experience in studying more than 50 insurgencies. There are no exceptions in that data pool.

”It is standard for all organizations to codify their procedures as they grow larger. With small organizations, they can conduct their activities through interpersonal communications among the few people in the organization. As the organization grows, becomes more geographically spread out and more people get involved, the rules must be declared and codified.”

“New rules are issued when there is a change or revision in strategy or doctrine in order to reorient the organization towards the new direction. Often this follows when a new leader or senior person wants to establish his view on the organization.”

“New rules and procedures might help to reign in parts of the organization that are starting to deviate from the main goals of the organization. But that is not very successful, unless the leadership of those deviant groups has first been convinced to follow the new rules beforehand. In other words, the new book of rules helps solidify

organizational power, but that power usually has to exist beforehand.”

This is differential analysis so there is no single correct answer, only a range of most probable answers consistent with the data, each with different implications for policy or operational responses.

Some Readers reported the code is a propaganda ploy that has no meaning. That is not an unreasonable answer but it leaves unexplained some data that is easily available on the Internet. Namely, that the Taliban distributed a less detailed code in 2006. Secondly, before the Internet, the Mujahedin and later the Taliban distributed still earlier versions of codes of conduct.

The reiteration of the codes with increasingly greater complexity and specificity implies the Taliban leadership ascribe importance to it. In fact the editions roughly correspond to new thresholds in the development and spread of the Taliban.

The US command in Kabul told the press that the Taliban are hypocrites because they do not follow the code. Now this is part of a counter-propaganda campaign, but it falls short.

Everyone knows that compliance has little bearing on the significance of the code as a measurement of the growth of a living system. Growth in all living systems requires continually updated rules. See James Miller, Living Systems, and Jeremy Campbell, The Grammatical Man. New information is the antidote to entropy in living systems; the survival of a living system requires, absolutely, new rules as the system grows or evolves or growth becomes unsustainable.

Consider US traffic laws. The police are under no obligation to stop all speeders or to enforce the parking regulations uniformly against all malefactors. For example, they can give parking tickets to every third car whose meter has expired. Those who get caught breaking the traffic laws have no defense of inconsistent enforcement. Inconsistent enforcement or compliance does not invalidate the code or render it irrelevant.

US news and intelligence services only report on nine distinct kinds of internal instability. They cover more than 190 countries and non-state actors, but only nine distinct phenomena. They are coup, assassination/decapitation, civil war, insurgency, revolution, secession/fragmentation, insurrection, anarchy, demographic changes.

Two salient features that distinguish each are organizational complexity and purpose. Thus, anarchy and inchoate popular protests evolve into insurrection and then into revolution by becoming more complex and more focused.

The transformation of an insurgency into a revolutionary movement is signaled by different organizational principles needed for leading a more complex and much larger organization.

The Taliban are following loosely what Westerners can readily discern is a business model of organization. Some brilliant and astute Readers argue the same is true of international terrorist groups. The significance of those assessments is that they are predictable with considerable precision.

Readers rightly should object, why should we believe the Taliban have breached another organizational threshold instead of re-issuing another propaganda tract? Because they are executing attacks in 211 of the 398 districts in Afghanistan, the largest number over the greatest area in the history of the Taliban. They are operating in more districts farther from the core Pashtun provinces of the south than when the emirate sat in Kabul.

Thus, the codes pass the congruency test in which its most probable implications are matched against the real world condition of the Taliban established by credible data. The data indicates the movement is larger and more widespread than ever, consistent with a need for new rules. As with the US traffic law, non-compliance will be dealt with as it is encountered.

Another consideration that influences the timing of the new rules is the Afghan national elections on 20 August. With a coordinated effort, the Taliban stand a chance to force cancellation of the elections or to discourage the voter turnout so that the elections fail as a statement of the will of the majority.

Propaganda, organizational complexity and a component of the campaign to de-legitimate the elections are all valid inferences in that they flow from and are supported by lots of credible evidence; they are not mutually exclusive and they are all high probability implications. They dictate the range of threats that policy and operational responses must address.

Special thanks to all who responded to the invitation for feedback.

End of NightWatch for 29 July.