
NightWatch
For the Night of 17 July 2009
Pat Buchanan, with his genius for capturing the lessons of
history and applying them today, wrote in June about an incident in
A General in the Tsar’s army rode up to Nicholas and advised that he either clear the square with fire or abdicate. Promptly the canons roared and Tsar Nicholas I ruled for 30 years.
The Han soldiers and police cleared the
The 17th Amendment was passed by the National Assembly (parliament) in 2003 at the request of General Musharaf to create a presidential system of government; subordinate the prime minister and National Assembly to the President and allow Musharraf to serve as Chief of Army Staff as well as President -- a prima facie violation of a separate constitutional provision which Musharraf’s National Assembly conveniently side-stepped. Repeal of this amendment was central to the 11-point agreement between Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Sharif’s PML-N that produced the coalition that trounced the pro-Musharraf party in national elections in 2008.
Zardari, as PPP leader, continues to renege on the
agreement. Repeal of that amendment would relegate the presidency to a
figurehead once again, as in
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision today, acquitted Nawaz Sharif of hijacking charges stemming from Musharraf’s 1999 coup against Sharif’s government, The Associated Press and all Pakistani media reported. This ruling removes the final impediment to Nawaz Sharif’s running for public office. Readers should expect him to be elected to the National Assembly by the end of the summer in a by-election in some remote PML-N constituency after one of his acolytes retires for health or other persona reasons.
With this ruling, the old politics resumes in earnest. Nawaz has made no secret that he wants revenge against Musharraf. Zardari and Musharraf’s presidential system have outlived their usefulness. The political system is on the path to restore the 1973 Constitution of a more authentic parliament.
Nawaz cannot yet become prime minister because of term limits still in effect. He has the skills, however, to persuade a compliant National Assembly to amend the constitution as easily as Musharraf did, so as to permit him to become prime minister again, in time.
Nawaz’ eventual return to prominent elected position in
Pakistan will not be good news for the US because the US fully backed
Musharraf, ignoring his insubordination to duly elected civilian authority; his
disregard for rule of law; his disdain for the 1973 Constitution and his destruction
of an elected, ever corrupt, parliamentary system of government passed on by
the founders of Pakistan. Nawaz would make the
Arif Jamal’s
Assessment. One of the foremost experts on jihad in
According to Jamal, Pakistani military strategists, led by
Colonel Akhbar Khan, used the term jihad to provide a more acceptable
cover term for government-sponsored, armed and violent subversion of
The strategy worked well as long as
Finally, Jamal said Musharraf never took action to restrain
insurgents in
For the Army, the enemy is
Musharraf, said
in an interview published today that “Extremism and terrorism from the Taliban
and Al Qaida, and not
The interview, recorded on Wednesday in
NightWatch Comment:
The overwhelming evidence is that Musharraf is a liar whose actions
always betrayed his words, and an opportunist who always goes for the money and
the spotlights. He continues to live under the delusion that he saved
He wants to return to office to vindicate his corrupt, even
by Pakistani standards, duplicitous administration. In this he is just like the
three military thugs who preceded him in subverting
What the
international media reported. Senior
Iranian cleric Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaking at
What Rafsanjani said. He told the believer his sermon has three parts and repeatedly asked them to not chant slogans or interrupt him.
The first part was a religious lesson from the life and death of Imam Kazem, the Seventh Shiite Imam.
The second part was his assessment of what needs to be done to create national unity.
The third part was his recommendation to release hostages whose detention was not necessary and only served the interests of foreigners.
The themes Rafsanjani stated as teacher of religion are that Iranians must have the patience of Kazem who was incarcerated in chains and blessed Allah for granting his prayer to have nothing to do all day but worship. Kazem was martyred and is an example of long suffering under conditions of hardship.
The second part of his sermon cited two requirements to stabilize conditions that he said might be described as a “crisis.’ First is obey the law. Everything that happens must occur within the framework of the law. He cited “Imam Khomeyni” repeatedly about the importance of creating an “Islamic Republic.”
Second is the need to restore the trust of the people. Rafsanjani cited his own credentials as a revolutionary of the Khomeyni generation and companion of Khomeyni, in insisting that the will of the people must be heard and respected.
The third and shortest part of his sermon was his statement
that to get past the crisis, the students needed to be released, not as a
matter of justice but because their incarceration strengthened
Comment: The sermon has many layers of meaning. The story of Imam Kazem, for example, appears to be a metaphor that implies that the revolution of Khomeyni, i.e., his vision of the Islamic Republic, is in chains. However, the example of Imam Kazem is of prayer and patience that ends in martyrdom with no redeeming change in the system that enchained him. Rajsanjani returned to this example in the second and third parts of his sermon.
In the second part of the sermon, Rafsanjani’s apparent trust in the law signifies his capitulation in the name of preserving the clerical regime … and no doubt his own family and wealth. His solution is to let the law work its course. In this he provided no encouragement to public displays or demonstrations. His message to the students was to trust the Imams, all of whom are Quranic lawyers, not theologians in the western sense.
The call for restoring trust in the people appears to have been directed at the regime. This is the strongest suggestion of capitulation because it set up the idea that the regime won and can show mercy now, so as to restore a sense of unity.
Several well informed analysts have noted that the internal conflict in the leadership is not about freedom or western style democracy. It is over what constitutes the orthodox legacy of Ayatollah Khomeyni.
Rafsanjani leads the faction, which includes Mousavi, that there can be no
single source of orthodoxy or authority to replace Khomeyni, meaning no one man.
His faction believes a committee of
religious leaders should be the ultimate political/religious authority in
Rajsanjani’s Islamic Republic and should act in an oversight capacity, not as a
policy maker. The death of Khomeyni ended that era, according to this faction.
As a companion of Khomeyni and a prominent figure in the Qom school of religion and politics, Rafsanjani’s views carry a lot of weight among the Grand Ayatollahs and ulema (religious scholars), not to mention the fact that he is one of the richest men in Iran. As for the students, he left them to the tender mercies of tear gas and the Revolutionary Guards.
Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadi-nejad support the view that the succession to Khomeyni should be a single religious authority; that the will of the people as expressed in elections is an input, but not a directive to the government and that a true Islamic state is authoritarian, as blessed by Allah.
Neither of these views seems to capture the sentiment of the
Rafsanjani’s sermon is a call to work within the system, not to overthrow it, and for the system to correct its treat its overreactions by treating Iranian youth with leniency. His justification is not because the regime has been unjust, but because the incarcerations are embarrassing and support external criticism.
Rafsanjani’s first sermon since the election is a call to live another day but work within the system. NightWatch suspects Rafsanjani, his family and all their wealth were threatened by Ahmadi-Nejad’s thugs in the Revolutionary Guards.
Post script: Rafsanjani did chide
International media today reported that the Indian and French Navies collaborated in a joint hostage rescue operation to recover and Indian dhow and its crew.
Venezuela-Honduras: Venezuelan President Chavez announced a
return of ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya "in the coming
hours," to
Chavez is more hard core about restoring Zelaya to office than Zelaya is. Looks like mirror-imaging and setting an example for the Venezuelan armed forces who already tried but failed to overthrow Chavez. He acts scared.
Members of the Police and Armed Forces, and the Human Rights
Commissioner, yesterday warned that Venezuelan President -- and former coupist
military officer -- Hugo Chavez's plans to fabricate a massacre in
According to sources which EL HERALDO had access to,
Chavez is the ideologist of what is called "plan Caracas," whose
goal is to destroy news media, burn vehicles, hurl bombs, and attack the demonstrators
so as to blame Honduran military and policemen. The plan also calls for the takeover of
Honduran Defense
Minister Adolfo Leonel Sevilla stated that his Ministry already had information
(about plan
Question: Is this the
type of subversion the US State Department is supporting? Chavez wants Zelaya
back in power more than Zelaya wants back in power.
Comment: Ortega has just joined the Chavez therapy group for extreme fear of their own armed forces. Both men fear the actions of the Honduran military will be emulated by their own, apparently. They ignore the facts that the Honduran military were acting under orders of the Congress and Supreme Court to pre-empt Zelaya’s referendum initiative to subvert and bypass the Honduran constitution. If their armed forces act to overthrow them, those would be genuine military coups.
End of NightWatch
for 17 July.